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Citizen Scientists, Data Transparency,
and the Mining Industry
Madison Condon

W

hat happens when a community feels that the
standards imposed by state and federal laws are
insuficient to protect its health and environment? Or when the responsible government
agencies lack the funding, competency, or political will for full
enforcement of the law? One of the greatest hurdles facing citizen environmental advocates in these situations is a lack of
access to environmental monitoring data. All routes available
for policing industry—whether it be rallying community support
for protest, petitioning a government agency for enforcement
action, or bringing a citizen suit—require, as a irst step, an
understanding of whether and what pollution has been released.
This article looks at a few examples of how citizen organizing, combined with changes in technology, have successfully
empowered communities to take environmental monitoring and
enforcement of the mining industry into their own hands.
President Trump’s budget, released in March 2017, proposes
a 31 percent funding cut to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). This cut includes a 24 percent decrease
in the budget of the EPA’s Ofice of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (Enforcement Ofice), the justiication being
that it “avoids duplication” with programs that are delegated
to states. Funding intended to be passed on from EPA to state
agencies, however, also is cut by nearly half—from $1.1 billion
to $597 million. The Environmental Council of the States
estimates that about one-third of state environmental agency
funding comes directly from EPA. It is unlikely that states will
be able to make up this deicit, thus a decrease of enforcement
at the state level also can be expected.
While the most recent proposed cuts are drastic, they are in
keeping with a trend that began before President Trump took
ofice. In its 2014–2018 Strategic Plan, EPA predicted that it
would be forced to make 25 percent fewer compliance inspections and bring one-third fewer enforcement actions than
it had in the years 2005–2009 because of declining budgets.
Between 1994 and 2010, EPA’s Enforcement Ofice lost 20
percent of its workforce. Last fall, the Center for Public Integrity reported that 40 states had decreased staff levels at their
environmental agencies over the past 10 years. Ten states had
reduced staff numbers by more than 20 percent.

Access to Data
Although organized citizen groups will attempt to rise to meet
this regulatory deicit, one of the greatest impediments for
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community policing of industry is lack of access to data. While
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and similar state public records laws are meant to provide citizens with access to
government collected pollution data (if the data is collected
at all), compliance with these disclosure requirements often is
incomplete or untimely. In 2015, a district court judge found
that EPA manifested a “continued disregard for its FOIA obligations.” Landmark Legal Found. v. EPA, 82 F. Supp. 3d 211,
213 (D.D.C. 2015).
This author’s own attempts at collecting Superfund costrecovery data was met with the explanation that the EPA
employee capable of querying the relevant database had
passed away several months before and had not yet been
replaced. The Center for Investigative Reporting has found
evidence suggesting that “state and local government secrecy
has increased in the past 10 years,” due, in part, to increasing disclosure fees and a government failure to keep up with
technical advances. Miranda Spivack, Local Governments Hide
Public Records, Face Few Consequences, Reveal, Nov. 16, 2016.
This lack of data access extends to a variety of government records, not merely pollution reporting. The nonproit
Earthworks has long highlighted the disconnect between
the predictions made in Environmental Impact Statements
(EISs) during a mine’s permitting process and the actual
measured impacts that exist once the mine has begun operations. A 2006 report undertook a case study of 25 mines and
found that while 100 percent of the mines’ EISs predicted
compliance with all applicable water quality standards,
76 percent of the mines exceeded these standards during
operation. Jim Kuipers and Ann Maest, Comparison of Predicted and Actual Water Quality at Hardrock Mines, Dec.
7, 2006, available at www.earthworksaction.org/library/detail/
comparison_of_predicted_and_actual_water_quality_at_
hardrock_mines/#.WRCZsrzyvdQ. One of the authors of the
report, Dr. Ann Maest, found that tracking down each of the
EISs was a challenge in itself: there is no central database,
at the state or federal level, that compiles approved EISs. In
addition, the operational compliance monitoring data rarely
are readily available in an organized electronic format. When
a concerned member of the public can obtain an EIS or the
water quality data, for example, from a state agency, often
the format of the information, such as a PDF rather than a
spreadsheet, hinders data analysis.
Citizens who wish to have a more complete understanding of the impact of industrial activities in their communities
do have other legal pathways available. In recent years the
phenomenon of citizen science has grown exponentially, supported by an increase in low-cost technology such as sensors
and drones, as well as advances in information sharing. Many
small, low-cost, monitoring devices interface directly with
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personal smartphones, making them readily available and easy
to use. Data collected by individual volunteers can be sent to
a central, publicly accessible, database where any interested
party can analyze this crowdsourced information. Under some
environmental statutes, citizens are granted the right to take
samples on industrial property that is otherwise private, or they
have the right to observe environmental sampling undertaken
by the regulated entity. Some advocacy groups have found
ways to force companies to directly disclose monitoring data to
impacted communities.

Good Neighbor Agreements
When a community is concerned about a polluting activity—a
mine, or a chemical plant, for example—one tool at its disposal is a private contract with the company operating the
activity. These contracts are sometimes called Good Neighbor
Agreements (GNAs). A GNA is a legally binding agreement
between a company and the surrounding community in which
the company agrees to various concessions that go above and
beyond those required under the law. These private contracts
are sometimes made in lieu of litigation or as part of a settlement, and they can save time and money for all involved
parties. In a climate where enforcement and monitoring on
the part of the government is slated to decline, a GNA can be
a useful tool for getting a company to disclose what exactly it
is releasing into the surrounding air and water. Some GNAs
support community-monitoring initiatives wherein volunteers are permitted to take, and sometimes analyze, their own
samples; others facilitate access to data that is generated by
the company but not otherwise readily available to the public. These agreements can serve the dual purpose of reducing
harmful industry behavior and empowering community members through a better understanding of whether the industry is
releasing contaminants above levels known to affect human or
ecosystem health.

Montana GNA: Stillwater Mine and NPRC
One well-known GNA is an agreement reached in Montana
(Montana GNA) between the Stillwater Mine and several
environmental groups, including the Northern Plains Research
Council (NPRC). In 1999, the Stillwater Mining Company
(SMC) was granted a permit to expand its platinum and palladium mining operation in south-central Montana. The citizen
groups sued the Montana Department of Environmental Quality, challenging the permit and arguing that the expanded
mining project would have an unacceptable environmental
impact. Knowing that the lawsuit and the negative press coverage it generated could hinder expansion plans, the mine
owners agreed to negotiate with the community groups. On
their side, the community groups felt that the state’s environmental laws had been under-enforced and eroded over time,
such that a private agreement might be their best opportunity
to obtain the desired environmental protections.
What resulted was a legally binding agreement whereby
the NPRC and its community partners agreed to drop their
permit challenge in exchange for various concessions made
by the mine. These concessions included SMC-funded thirdparty environmental audits and expanded water quality and
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isheries monitoring. SMC agreed to maintain a publicly accessible electronic database of all historic baseline data and all
SMC monitoring undertaken in compliance with federal or
state environmental laws or the GNA itself. The negotiated
agreement also gave community representatives the right to
observe all sampling and monitoring activities undertaken by
SMC. The most remarkable provision gave community groups
the right to “conduct Citizen Sampling of the Environment for
any physical, chemical, or biological parameter.” Good Neighbor Agreement between Stillwater Mining Company and
Northern Plains Resource Council, et al., signed May 8, 2000,
available at www.northernplains.org/issues/good-neighboragreement. With 24-hours’ notice, the citizen groups have the
right to enter SMC premises to collect samples. SMC agreed
to reimburse the citizen groups for their expenses in carrying
out the implementation of the GNA, up to $135,000 annually. This funding was to “offset the costs of conducting citizen
sampling” and to ensure that the community has “the technical and scientiic expertise necessary” to carry out the sampling
activities, including fees for environmental consultants.

GNAs can serve the dual
purpose of reducing harmful
industry behavior and
empowering community
members through a better
understanding of whether
the industry is releasing
contaminants above levels
known to affect human or
ecosystem health.
The concessions gained by the environmental advocacy
groups were hard fought. Although the mine readily agreed
to undertake other requested actions, such as implementing
a trafic management plan and placing company land under
a conservation easement, the negotiations nearly failed over
the transparency requirements. The mining company initially
sought to insert a “secrecy clause” whereby any monitoring
and auditing data would be kept conidential, even if it had
been collected by a third-party auditor on behalf of the citizen
groups. Community group representatives walked out of the
negotiations and explained to a local paper that conidentiality provisions were a deal breaker: the “testing, sampling, [and]
inspections” were necessary if they were going to successfully
“shine a light on what the company was doing.” The Associated Press, Stillwater Mine “Good Neighbor” Pact Breaks Down,
Montana Standard, M (Jan. 26, 2000).
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Water quality monitoring data
in OHA’s online interactive
graphing database enabled
the Alliance to understand
local pollution trends and
was instrumental in its
advocacy to get Ecology to take
enforcement action.
Okanogan Highlands Alliance and Buckhorn
Mine
The success of the GNA at the Stillwater Mine has been
noted by other communities ighting the negative impacts of
large-scale mining operations. The Okanogan Highlands Alliance (OHA) relied on the Montana GNA as a model in its
own effort to monitor and mitigate the effects of a mine in
Washington State. OHA was originally formed in 1992 to
ight a proposed open pit cyanide-leach gold mine on Buckhorn Mountain in north-central Washington. After eight
years of participation in public process, administrative appeals,
and litigation, the project was eventually abandoned after
the Washington State Pollution Control Hearings Board
ruled that the mine posed a signiicant risk to water quality without a suficient mitigation plan. In 2004, the mining
company announced an amended plan to construct an underground mine on the same site. OHA once again became
actively involved in permitting proceedings, appealing the
notice of construction, waste discharge permit, water quality certiication, and tailings expansion approval issued by the
Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology). Because
of a new law meant to expedite projects in economically challenged communities, OHA was prohibited from litigating the
challenge until after all permits had been issued; the mine was
constructed before the case could go to trial.
With less than a month before trial was set to commence
on OHA’s challenges to the permits, the community group and
the owner of the mine, Crown Resources, announced they had
reached a settlement agreement. Under the terms of the 2008
settlement, Crown agreed to hire an OHA-approved independent third party to do monitoring and environmental reporting
and to increase the number of monitoring locations overall. In
addition, Crown provided the inancial resources that enabled
OHA to hire its own consultant to perform annual audits and
undertake data analysis to evaluate Crown’s third-party indings. Crown agreed to collect baseline water quality data from
nearby drinking wells within a certain proximity to the mine.
Finally, under the terms of the agreement, Crown was obligated to share all monitoring data directly with OHA and to
include OHA in annual meetings when the company discusses
monitoring results with the regulatory agencies. David Kliegman, executive director of OHA, reports that “[a]s a general
statement the success of the settlement is dependent on the
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manager at the mine site. Early on we had a better working
relationship with the company, but under the current management we are kept at arm’s length. The company adheres to the
exact terms of the settlement but nothing more.” Telephone
interview with David Kliegman, Executive Director, Okanogan Highlands Alliance (Dec. 14, 2016).
Under the 2008 settlement, once OHA obtains water
quality monitoring data, its staff puts the data in an online
interactive graphing database that the Alliance shares with
all interested parties. There, the data can be iltered by sampling location and speciic contaminant. Pollutant levels over
time can be analyzed, comparing background to current values.
Almost immediately after the Buckhorn Mine began operation, it was in violation of its pollutant discharge (NPDES)
permits. The database enabled OHA to understand local pollution trends and was instrumental in its advocacy to get
Ecology to take enforcement action. Washington State has a
limited history of hardrock mining, and, as a result, Ecology
has limited technical capacity for understanding the environmental impacts of the mine and enforcing the permit limits.
OHA uses its own analysis of the pollution data to communicate to its membership and works to translate this knowledge
into advocacy action. In 2012, OHA sent its seasonal newsletter, the Buckhorn Bulletin, to all its members, highlighting that
the mine had discharged pollutants in excess of its permits,
and that Ecology “has known of these violations for 9 months
. . . [yet] has failed to issue any citations.” Action Alert: There
Should Be Consequences, Buckhorn Bulletin (Winter 2012).
The newsletter provided the contact information of the director of Ecology and the governor of Washington under the
headline, “If you say nothing, no one will know you care.” Id.
Six months after this call to action, the following issue of the
Buckhorn Bulletin reported that Ecology had issued a $395,000
penalty against the mine. OHA’s director points out that OHA
alone did not bring about this penalty but was a key advocate in the effort to get Ecology to perform its environmental
enforcement obligations.
As a part of its initial ight against the proposed open-pit
mine in the 1990s, OHA lobbied the Washington State legislature for a comprehensive mining act. Due in part to OHA’s
efforts, the legislature passed the Metals Mining and Milling Operations Act in 1997. One of the provisions that OHA
successfully petitioned for mandates: “If an interested citizen
or citizen group so requests of the department of ecology, the
metals mining and milling operator or applicant shall work
with the department of ecology and the interested party to
make arrangements for citizen observation and veriication
in the taking of required water samples.” RCW 78.56.100(1)
(c)(1997). As a result, interested citizens can observe the
Buckhorn Mine’s sampling procedures at designated times
throughout the year.

Mitigation of Harmful Environmental Impacts
The Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
similarly gives citizens the right to participate in inspection
of coal mines that are allegedly violating environmental law.
In practice, however, this right is not always honored. Last
fall the Sierra Club iled a lawsuit appealing a Department
of Interior decision to deny a citizen group request to inspect
a Virginia coal mine. The community organization, Southern Appalachian Mountain Stewards, runs the Appalachian
NR&E Fall 2017

Published in Natural Resources & Environment Volume 32, Number 2, Fall 2017. © 2017 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may
not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.

Citizens Enforcement (ACE) Project, which has as its mission
to equip “everyday people with the knowledge, instruments,
and professional support to monitor local waterways.” Appalachian Citizens Enforcement Project, www.ace-project.org.
ACE’s website further explains that “[i]n some cases, state
agencies in the Appalachian coal-bearing regions have failed
to hold the coal industry accountable for inaccurate and sometimes unlawful record keeping of surface water impacts. This
lack of enforcement highlights the need for independent
water monitoring.” Id. The data collected by the ACE volunteers is compiled in a publicly accessible database and has
been used by citizen groups to ight coal mining permits, advocate for increased water quality standards, and request oficial
enforcement.
Mitigation of harmful environmental impacts is the primary goal of these citizen monitoring initiatives, but there are
additional beneits. Because of the Montana GNA, community members living near the mine can volunteer to undertake
a visual inspection of the site and participate in taking wastewater, stream, air, and soil samples. They are trained and
supervised by a full-time consultant paid for by the mining
company. Once a year, many volunteers participates in a biomonitoring event. At the Buckhorn Mine in Washington,
citizens observe the third-party auditors four times a year and
submit citizen water quality monitoring reports. These reports
are mostly informal and narrative in style and often include
comments such as, “[I] would encourage anyone to participate in the citizen’s monitoring process. It is eye opening and
extremely informative.” www.buckhorncaa.org/December2008-cwqm-report. These programs compensate for a deicit
in government oversight while beneitting the communities
in substantial ways. Citizens learn the fundamentals of environmental science, gaining real skills in sampling and data
analysis. This in turn helps them become empowered in the
face of large industry and facilitates more effective advocacy.
In communities with a long history of underregulated industry, a deep distrust can develop, not only of the industry and its
owners, but also of the regulators themselves. Citizen oversight
can help rebuild this trust. For companies that strive to operate
within the limits of the law and have an interest in building
their public reputation, support of community participation is
in their interest.
GNAs are not limited to the mining industry. A survey of
10 successful GNAs identiied private agreements with 4 reineries, 3 chemical plants, a pharmaceutical company, a coal
mine, and a dairy. Douglas S. Kenney, et al., Evaluating the Use
of Good Neighbor Agreements for Environmental and Community Protection, Nat. Res. Law Ctr., Univ. of Colo. Sch. of Law
(2004). In some of these agreements, the company agreed to
comply with a community demand, such as implementation
of a trafic plan or relocation compensation, and community
involvement was thereafter kept to a minimum once the conlict had been resolved. But in other cases, the company agreed
to stricter monitoring and reporting requirements, sometimes
veriied by a third-party auditor paid for the company. Some
GNAs actively involved community volunteers in monitoring
and inspection of the facilities.

Increased Citizen Involvement
Data collected by amateurs has been used to bring citizen suits
under federal environmental statutes. The Sierra Club, for
NR&E Fall 2017

example, has successfully pursued several lawsuits under the
Clean Water Act against coal mines for releasing pollutants
whose presence was irst discovered by amateur sampling. Citizen-collected data, however, serves a much broader range of
environmental advocacy purposes beyond supporting enforcement actions. In an administrative proceeding, for example,
the evidentiary standards are less strict. If a community group
believes that there are excessive contaminant releases related
to a regulated activity and have some data to back up this
belief, they can encourage the agency to take samples on its
own. As Dr. Ann Maest points out, because the agency is
then the one taking samples, this information can be obtained
through FOIA requests.
Government agencies have realized that increased transparency and citizen involvement are tools that can be used support
their mission to regulate environmental harms effectively. In
2012, EPA rolled out what it calls “Next Generation Compliance,” a strategy that relies more heavily on technological
advances and transparency initiatives. Two of the pillars of this
“Next Gen” compliance are (1) a shift toward electronic reporting, and (2) an increase in public access to monitoring data.
See www.epa.gov/compliance/next-generation-compliance. In
a justiication for these priorities, the former assistant administrator for EPA’s Enforcement Ofice, Cynthia Giles, pointed
to a 2008 study that found requiring drinking water systems to
mail water quality reports directly to customers reduced severe
health violations by 40 to 57 percent. Reputation matters, and
transparency can be an enforcement tool in itself. According to
Giles, “[e]ven in an era of very tight budgets, thoughtful transparency strategies can improve results, and open the door for
private sector development of apps that will make a difference.”
Cynthia Giles, Next Generation Compliance, The Envtl. Forum,
Sept–Oct. 2013. Several of EPA’s recent enforcement settlements require the corporate defendant to upload continuous
monitoring data to a publicly available website.
The National Advisory Council for Environmental Policy
and Technology (NACEPT) recently issued a report calling for
EPA to “proactively and fully integrate citizen science into the
work of EPA.” NACEPT, Environmental Protection Belongs
to the Public, A Vision for Citizen Science at EPA, Dec. 2016,
available at www.epa.gov/sites/production/iles/2016-12/
documents/nacept_cs_report_inal_508_0.pdf. The report
encourages EPA to work with communities to ensure that citizen-collected data meets quality standards and to use that data
in its monitoring and enforcement agenda. In a 2015 publication from the Energy and Mineral Law Institute, two private
irm lawyers representing industry warn about the coming rise
of citizen suits: “While citizen lawsuits have long existed, environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) are
beginning to utilize them with increasing frequency, often taking innovative approaches to expand their reach.” Miranda
Yost and Patrick Fanning, Citizen “Suit Yourself”: New (and
Very Real) Water Compliance Challenges for Coal Power Utilities,
36 Energy & Min. L. Inst. 4, at 102 (2015). The article further
cautions that environmental nonproits are becoming “increasingly sophisticated at harnessing [industry reported] raw data
to support their own enforcement efforts.” Id. at 109.
In spring 2015, the Wyoming legislature passed a law that
many advocates characterized as “criminaliz[ing] citizen science.” Justin Pidot, Forbidden Data, Slate.com, May 11, 2015.
The law, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-3-414, prohibits the collection
of “resource data” with the intention of submitting the data to
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Citizen advocacy initiatives
are about more than
volunteer research; they
represent a larger trend
toward the democratization of
environmental regulation and
community empowerment.
a state or federal government agency. The original text of the
bill criminalized data collection, including taking photographs,
on all “open land.” After a federal judge found it “dificult to
conceive a permissible rationale for preventing the collection of resource data on lands which the public has the right
to be upon” the law was limited to apply only to data collection requiring trespass on private lands. W. Watersheds Project
v. Michael, No. 15-CV-0169-SWS, 2015 WL 12852338, at *17
(D. Wyo. Dec. 28, 2015).

Resources Required to Police Industry
GNAs and other private citizen actions are not a cure-all for
absence of government power. In nearly all the GNA cases
surveyed in the Colorado Law School study, the community groups could force the company to the negotiating table

because they had signiicant leverage given to them by some
gatekeeping process established by state or federal law, such
as a permit requirement. Without this “stick,” the “carrot” of
positive publicity may be insuficient to gain binding commitments from the company. In both the Stillwater and the
Buckhorn cases, the members of the community groups were
well organized and had signiicant time and other resources
to devote to their cause. NPRC estimates that their volunteers spend between 20 and 60 hours a month on participatory
monitoring and other activities under the GNA. Not all citizen groups have such resources to devote to policing industry,
a fact especially problematic given that polluting facilities are
often disproportionately sited near disadvantaged communities. See, e.g., Jane Kay and Cheryl Katz, Pollution, Poverty,
People of Color: The Factory on the Hill, Envtl. Health News,
June 4, 2012.
With EPA’s resources set to be slashed and its enforcement
priorities diminished, an ever-growing need exists for civil
society to monitor the actions of polluting industries. Private
agreements between a community and a company that require
third-party audits and data sharing are one mechanism for facilitating transparency and enforcement. Community education
and participation by volunteer monitors are one ancillary beneit to such agreements. These agreements cannot be expected
to replace fully the need for local and federal regulators but can
be a useful tool in supporting regulators’ efforts and holding
them to their duties. The OHA website explains: “it is important for Ecology to know that the public is watching, and we
expect our laws to be executed.” See www.okanoganhighlands.
org/mine-monitoring/mine-seepage. Citizen advocacy initiatives are about more than volunteer research; they represent a
larger trend toward the democratization of environmental regulation and community empowerment.

Make the most of your
Section membership—
JOIN A COMMITTEE!
SEER has 31 substantive committees ranging from Air Quality and
Forest Resources to Nuclear Law and Mining and Mineral Extraction.
Plus—they’re free to join!
Stay current through Committee newsletters and conference calls,
network with leaders, and ind opportunities to get published.
Visit www.ambar.org/environcommittees to sign up.
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